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Being a nuclear operator is a responsibility like no other. As a 
power generation company, Électricité de France (EDF) has the 
important mission to deliver electricity to the population in order 
to meet its daily needs in a timely manner. On top of this public 
service mission, as a nuclear operator, we have the hefty respon-
sibility of ensuring the safety of our facilities. It is crucial to main-
tain the trust of the stakeholders, and above all that of public 
opinion. Although the same motto is relevant for a broad range 
of industrial sectors—aircraft, automotive, and construction—I 
believe it to be even more crucial for nuclear. Indeed, safety is the 
key in ensuring the development of the nuclear industry in the 
world today.
1.  Operation is key in nuclear safety
How can safety be guaranteed in nuclear facilities? This ques-
tion is paramount for the future of our industry. Looking back at 
the main accidents in the history of nuclear development—Three 
Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima—it is clear in each case 
that operation was at the root of the accident. The Fukushima 
accident sparked a global debate among nuclear industry compa-
nies, governments, and proponents of public opinion on the safe-
ty devices of the plant and their inaccuracy. Around the world, 
the concern for safety increased and equipment was upgraded. 
Nuclear reactor makers have pushed forward the “Generation III” 
label with a new level of safety equipment as a guarantee against 
further Fukushima-style accidents. When it comes to addressing 
safety issues, however, a focus on technology is misleading. In 
fact, the Fukushima accident was due to a weakness in the indus-
trial organization and to mistakes during the operation process. 
It is, of course, necessary to have the highest level of “technical 
safety” for equipment at nuclear facilities in order to limit the 
consequences of severe accidents. However, these technological 
devices are of limited use unless they are properly integrated into 
a consistent operation culture. Technology cannot cover every 
situation, and especially not the numerous possibilities of human 
misconduct and error. 
After Fukushima, it was apparent that the safety of nuclear 
facilities relies on their operators. This fact has been blurred in 
recent decades because reactor manufacturers have been eager 
to promote and upgrade their own technologies, on the premise 
that their newly developed technologies are safer than those used 
formerly and than those of their competitors. This global compe-
tition has led to an “over-technologization” of the nuclear indus-
try. It has brought some interesting innovations; yet it has also 
spread the false idea that technology will be the ultimate solution 
for nuclear safety. Thus far, over-technologization has led to high 
additional costs and to complex checking processes, creating dif-
ficulties for companies in charge of construction. Technological 
innovation is very important and must be strongly supported; 
however, it cannot be the driver of the whole industry. Technol-
ogy must be developed in accordance with the realities of opera-
tional needs, for the sake of safe and competitive operational re-
cords. For this reason, I believe that operators should be the main 
drivers of technological innovation and should draw the industry 
toward excellent safety levels. 
2.  Three pillars to master industrial tools
To achieve such high safety levels and operational performanc-
es, operators must master their production tools. To do so, they 
must focus on three specific areas of the nuclear industrial busi-
ness: the design of the production tool, an extensive knowledge 
of the suppliers and equipment (constituting these production 
tools) and, most importantly, the broad in-depth empirical knowl-
edge acquired through operating these tools. It is the interaction 
of these three areas that determines the quality of the industrial 
process as a whole and therefore the level of safety. Of these three 
pillars of the organizational system, empirical knowledge above 
all is the system’s engine. Many industrial companies have built 
their success stories on feedback from empirical knowledge. A 
well-known case is that of Rolls Royce, famous for its luxury cars 
but also a major aircraft engine manufacturer, the second larg-
est in the world. All of their engines are fitted with sensors that 
transmit data (oil, pressure, etc.) when the aircraft is flying. As a 
result, Rolls Royce has built up an in-depth knowledge of engine 
behavior during operation, enabling the company to continuously 
fix flaws and upgrade their performance. 
Gaining full operational control through a complete knowledge 
of the industrial tools is the ambition of any responsible industrial 
actor. The French nuclear power industry is no exception. EDF has 
collected empirical data over decades of reactor operation and 
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this data has now become a reference for industrial management. 
In order to tap into this large quantity of data and use it as a lever 
to master its industrial tools, EDF has set up an original integrated 
industrial model. This organization is consistent with the initial 
goal of covering the three components of our strategy: design, 
suppliers, and operational feedback. Since the very early days 
of nuclear power plant construction in France, during the early 
1970s, EDF has put at the core of its activity a consistent team of 
engineers tasked with setting up a continuous improvement loop 
based on empirical data. Today, around 5000 engineers are as-
sisting 20 000 operators. These workers are a key element in en-
abling EDF to benefit from its learning curve, challenge its habits 
and processes, and adapt and upgrade its management schemes; 
and all this with the constant goal of achieving excellence in both 
operations and safety standards. 
3.  Being an architect of the nuclear industry
In order for this integrated model to be consistent and effi-
cient, its extent should not be limited to plant operation. Master-
ing the industrial tools requires extending the improvement loop 
to the design of the plant and to the manufacturing of the equip-
ment used in operating it. This requirement has led EDF to build 
strong links between the company as an operator and its suppli-
ers. There is constant dialogue between engineers and manufac-
turers on equipment standards, such as on valves, pumps, pipes, 
and so forth, as well as during each step of the plant design and 
construction process. The empirical feedback acquired through 
operation benefits the whole industry, and the whole industry 
aligns with the common goal of achieving the best performance 
and safety records.
The operator is at the core of this integrated industrial model 
and plays a very special role as both the engine and the driver of 
the whole system. This role is labeled “architect-engineer.” From 
this central position, EDF has completely mastered its industrial 
production tools and has developed its own reactors. Our compa-
ny is able to implement an articulated industrial policy: It deter-
mines how contracts are divided into batch lots, sets the rules for 
the competition policy, and monitors the certification of national 
or foreign suppliers. The architect-engineer can bridge the needs 
of the operator and the capacity of the manufacturers; it inspects 
the production line and monitors the details of the contractual 
requirements. The relationship between the architect-engineer 
and the equipment suppliers is a key part of industrial mastery. 
Such organization requires the operator to have a full knowledge 
of the industrial context.
4.  Leveraging on standardization to improve safety and 
performance
The EDF industrial model is oriented toward safety and per-
formance. It also steadily improves the efficiency of industrial fa-
cilities and thereby leads to a long-term lowering of construction 
costs for nuclear power plants. The model aligns with a standard-
ization of the industrial tools. An integrated model and standard-
ization are mutually promoting elements that push the industrial 
organization in the same direction. Indeed, standardization is 
another factor that increases the value of empirical feedbacks. 
As an operator develops industrial facilities based on the same 
industrial technology and standards, the scale of its improvement 
loop increases. For EDF, in France, the smallest flaw during the 
operation of one of our 58 reactors is analyzed by our engineers 
and the feedback is used to upgrade the performance of the other 
reactors, or to prevent the same problem from happening again. 
Standardization improves the efficiency of the learning curve; 
however, the cornerstone of the learning curve is the sharing of 
operation feedback, whether with a single operator or between 
different operators around the world, even if they do not use the 
same technology.
Standardization was a clear choice in the early stages of de-
velopment of the French nuclear fleet. The development and 
records of the French fleet show that standardization has several 
advantages. In addition to increasing the amount of empirical 
data and therefore leading to a better mastering of the facilities, 
standardization produces a crucial “series effect.” This effect is 
paramount to such a capital-intensive industry. Thanks to stand-
ardization, construction costs are lower, as are operational costs, 
which appear to be 40%–70% lower in France today than any-
where else in the world. To make full use of the virtuous circle of 
standardization, EDF has promoted the launch and development 
of a comprehensive technical reference base: the “codes and 
standards” for the nuclear industry. Piloted by the AFCEN† asso-
ciation, these codes are very rich technical frames of reference 
nurtured by our knowledge and experience. The first design and 
construction rules were established in the 1980s, followed by 
codes progressively covering every area of the nuclear industry: 
the chemical composition of materials, how these materials are 
fabricated, prerequisite regulatory tests for equipment going into 
service, welding, and so forth. These dense and structured texts 
were progressively enforced by safety authorities and equipment 
suppliers. Today, these codes and standards are the best tool for 
monitoring the accuracy of our industrial organization and the 
conformity of the facilities and equipment. They provide a very 
solid and concrete foundation for standardization and the imple-
mentation of an improvement loop within the nuclear industry.
The whole French nuclear industry is organized in such a way 
as to benefit from empirical feedback. This organization has ex-
cellent safety and performance records. France has experienced 
no nuclear incidents in its roughly 40-year nuclear operation his-
tory (no incident above level 2 of the International Nuclear Event 
Scale or INES chart), and the availability of the French fleet is very 
high, reaching 90% during the peak season in winter. Thanks to 
its architect-engineer position, EDF has been able to continuously 
upgrade the safety level of its nuclear facilities through regular 
comprehensive check-ups, enabling the company to implement 
improvements stemming from its empirical knowledge. In that 
respect, we can now say that the oldest nuclear plants are the 
ones with the highest level of safety.
5.  Nuclear industry benefits from international cooperation
I believe that integrated organization is not only a model for 
EDF and France but should be extended to the whole nuclear in-
dustry world-wide. The countries with the most dynamic nuclear 
industries, namely France, Russia, and China, have already adopt-
ed this integrated model for their nuclear programs. Spreading 
the architect-engineer model benefits the performance and safety 
of the whole industry. From this perspective, we should enhance 
cooperation and exchange between operators around the world 
in order to share their experience feedbacks. To a certain extent, 
this has been the case between the French and Chinese nuclear 
industries since EDF and China General Nuclear Power Corpo-
ration (CGN) developed China’s first jointly-built nuclear power 
plant in Daya Bay (Guangdong) 30 years ago. The integration of 
† French Association for the rules governing the Design, Construction, and Operation Supervision of the Equipment Items for Electro Nuclear Boilers.
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best practices and the transfer of empirical knowledge, acquired 
while running the French fleet, has spared China a decade of 
development. Today, the convergence of the French and Chinese 
reactor fleet standards and the long-term cooperation between 
EDF and its Chinese partners has broadened the basis for collect-
ing experience feedback, with mutual benefit. As the next step 
in cooperation, EDF is inviting its partners, CGN and the China 
National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), to cooperate in address-
ing third-country markets. This step will help Chinese players to 
avoid a long and costly learning curve when facing the require-
ments of foreign safety authorities, while EDF will benefit from 
the strong industrial capacities of Chinese nuclear players. Our 
EPRTM reactor project in the UK follows the same path. I believe 
this virtuous cooperation should be promoted even further and 
spread widely. EDF has achieved some progress by founding the 
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which aims at 
sharing operating experience and consequently enhancing nucle-
ar safety for all the countries involved.
EDF has not waited for a global framework of data-sharing; it 
has already started to learn from others’ experiences. Using the 
same improvement-loop approach that was applied within the 
French fleet, EDF has learned from the history of nuclear acci-
dents. For example, after the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, 
several modifications were made on the French fleet, both techni-
cal (e.g., a hydrogen recombining device and sand-filters) and op-
erational (a piloting scheme to operate the reactor in precarious 
situations). Similarly, after the Fukushima accident, 300 EDF engi-
neers worked for six months to learn from it; they came up with 
a large range of improvements for the nuclear reactors in order to 
enhance their safety. This comprehensive upgrading program is 
still continuing in France, with significant investments planned in 
safety equipment and devices.
One must admit that the global nuclear industry is currently 
ruled more by competition than by cooperation. This trend is 
enhanced by the “turnkey” approach that is supported by reactor 
suppliers. According to this model, which has been adopted by 
the United States and Japan, the constructor leads the organiza-
tion of the industrial project and is in constant communication 
with the safety agency and suppliers during the design and 
construction phase. Except for being the final paymaster, the op-
erator has a very minor role in this crucial phase before the com-
missioning. However, the operator is solely responsible for safety 
during operation. The nuclear industry is not like its automotive 
counterpart: The nuclear operator must master its industrial tools 
to prevent any accident, whereas a driver need not have an in-
depth knowledge of the internal functioning of his or her car in 
order to avoid crashes. 
6.  What our industry needs
The fact that the Fukushima accident occurred in a country 
with a very high level of technical skills and access to advanced 
technologies shows that the key point for safety is not technology 
but industrial organization. One of the weaknesses of Japanese 
operators, for instance, is their lack of exchange with manufac-
turers regarding operational experience. Consequently, the same 
defect in equipment can lead to the same accident twice because 
the lesson has not been learned. Another drawback may be terri-
torial fragmentation: In Germany, for example, the local Länder 
(local governments) sets different nuclear safety standards and 
rules, which lead to one plant having different organizations than 
another. In such a situation, it is challenging if not impossible to 
share empirical knowledge. The turnkey approach of the nuclear 
industry has led to this kind of situation, with very serious conse-
quences for safety. Beyond this approach, the whole technology- 
oriented framework sets up a deadlock for the nuclear industry. 
Fierce competition between vendors leads to the deceptive belief 
that having the most sophisticated technology is a guarantee of 
a facility’s safety, and this belief overshadows the importance of 
operational practices. Following their commercial purposes, ven-
dors tend to promote new models, leading to a fragmented indus-
try landscape with a less efficient learning loop.
Taking a broader look at the nuclear industry enables us to 
identify additional players with key roles in ensuring safety. 
The organization of the sector, with the operator at its core as 
architect-engineer, is necessary but insufficient. To ensure a 
stable and balanced development of the nuclear industry and 
good safety levels, two other players have crucial roles: the state, 
which is in charge of defining the energy policy, and the safety 
agency, which is in charge of checking and enhancing the safety 
standards through dialogue with the operator and manufacturers. 
We all know from experience that a healthy development of the 
nuclear industry requires a long-term perspective. By setting up a 
long-term and well-defined framework, governments enable op-
erators to play their roles as architect-engineers. This framework 
is, for example, composed of clear guidelines for the long-term 
evolution of the energy mix, of wisely oriented subsidies, and 
lastly, of a consistent schooling program to support the develop-
ment of the industry. As discussed earlier, safety lies in the engi-
neering capacity of the operator. This kind of skill requires years 
of training for a workforce to be operational and efficient. Moreo-
ver, safety is as much a question of culture as one of skill. Once in 
operation, operators still need years of training in order to utterly 
implement the engineering culture. In addition, investments in 
nuclear energy are huge and spread out over decades: 5–6 years 
for construction, 40–60 years of operation, and at least 20 more 
years for decommissioning—almost a century-long commitment! 
However, the electricity needs in every country are changing 
quickly and companies are exposed to financial pressure, com-
manding short-term returns on investment. In this respect, the 
time constraint is challenging for nuclear players and can have 
consequences for safety. The state has a role to play in helping 
nuclear industry players to tackle this challenge.
7.  A few guidelines for the future of nuclear reactors
As China’s nuclear industry has entered full-speed develop-
ment, the question of timing is now very important in order to 
pave the way for a healthy capacity for growth alongside high 
safety levels. In France, where we have been focusing on opera-
tional experience feedback, our engineers are steadily working to 
improve our industrial tools, providing guidelines for the future 
of nuclear reactors. What are these guidelines as of today? We 
keep to our principles: We implement the learning curve from 
empirical knowledge, and we require the suppliers involved in 
the design of the facilities to better take into account their con-
straints. This integration process and the cooperation dynamics 
between nuclear players do not mean that there is no room for 
market-based rules. For example, whereas cooperation between 
nuclear operators is highly desirable, competition among equip-
ment suppliers is a very good lever to stimulate innovation and 
thereby enhance the performance of the whole industry. In my 
opinion, this virtuous balance between cooperation and compe-
tition is embodied by China’s thermal power market. On the one 
hand, Chinese generation companies develop almost the same 
industrial tools based on very similar technology. On the other 
hand, the strong competition between manufacturers has brought 
very competitive manufacturers to China, which are now winning 
contracts all over the world.
When discussing the future of the nuclear industry, we must 
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also consider the needs of and requests from clients, and compe-
tition with other energies. In that respect, every industrial actor 
must find the best design to keep costs reasonable while main-
taining safety standards at their highest level. Standardization 
could be a solution to lower these costs and, at the same time, 
enhance the improvement-loop efficiency. Today, even if we in 
France and Europe have no plans for in building nuclear reactors 
on a large scale, we must continue to leverage on standardiza-
tion. How? The design of our plants should avoid specific equip-
ment that is not already manufactured on an industrial scale. 
This choice enables us to save time and money when replacing 
these spare parts. For example, the mere decision of developing 
tailored taps for one type of nuclear facility (or even for one 
function within this facility) can trigger heavy logistical burdens 
and significant additional costs. We must balance the operation-
al benefits of this decision. Nuclear equipment must be sourced 
from existing industrial productions when possible regarding 
nuclear specific standards. This is part of a general trend that 
aims at developing a design that matches the realities of indus-
trial needs. 
Like many other industries, the nuclear industry is implement-
ing “design-to-cost” principles to avoid useless technical sophis-
tication and its corresponding additional costs. The accumulation 
of safety recommendations and the extension of some specific 
equipment for special sites have led to a large number of details 
and devices in the design of our nuclear plants. Faced with this 
increasingly sophisticated design, we have to integrate regular 
self-check and balance processes: Our engineers must question 
design choices in order to get rid of unnecessary equipment. This 
questioning is also part of the improvement loop. Moreover, be-
cause engineering is the cornerstone of our industrial organiza-
tion, we have to keep increasing its efficiency as well. 
Taking these principles into account, we are able to guide the 
evolution of our nuclear plant design in the right direction with 
a general target of optimization. This strategy prepares for the 
future of nuclear plants, which will benefit from strong links be-
tween engineering and operation, monitored costs, and the best 
safety levels possible. Today, nuclear energy is the only steady and 
massive low-carbon energy. In that respect, the nuclear industry 
makes a unique contribution toward fighting climate change. 
Industrial players have the responsibility to deliver the right pro-
duction tool to achieve this historic mission.
